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ABSTRACT
It is undeniable that modern technology has been penetrating our contemporary life in 
myriad aspects. From the water we drink, foods we eat, to the installed applications in 
our phone. Hence modern technology has become one dominating worldview on its 
own which skips our reflection upon it. Its rapid growth stems from the dismissal of 
tradition and simultaneously with the tremendous scientific discoveries with its inherent 
instrumental rationality. It actively participates in serving the irrational dimension of 
our cybernetics-contemporary life. Thus it is not a neutral ensemble of devices, but 
normatively-prescriptive directs our being in achieving our goals mechanically. As 
Heidegger said, it enframes our being in the world in a disembodied fashion. Enframing, 
is the quintessence of modern technology. Merleau-Ponty, as another ardent critic, also 
stated that modern technology is essentially manipulative. Under the heading of scientism 
(and or cybernetics), it anesthetizes humanity as its own manipulandum. Contrasting 
with such view, art potentially re-attunes our relation with things. From Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological perspective, art (especially painting) powerfully shows the pre-
reflective and embodied contact with the world. This paper is an attempt to show the role 
of art in a life that has been eclipsed by the modern technological worldview. 
Keywords: modern technology, enframing, disembodied, painting
ModErn tECHnoloGy AS A WorldvIEW – A BACKGround
This first part of the paper is an attempt to mainly concern on how modern 
technology has become a dominating worldview in the life of our contemporary 
society. Some understandings from different perspectives will be presented 
before touching upon the main philosophical concern. This is necessary for 
exposing two things. First, it is quite challenging for us to come up one absolute 
interpretation on technology and it would be too ambitious to do that. Secondly, 
it is an initial stage before touching upon what really matters, which is to expose 
how problematic it is when modern technology has become one dominating 
worldview.
The most common interpretation of technology perhaps it is an always changing 
bag of tricks (like that of magician hat) that helps us to live healthier, happier, 
therefore we will have more fulfilling lives (Li-Hua, 2009, p. 18). Though it may 
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sound rather hedonistic in a vulgar and naïve sense - a life full of enjoyment 
equals to a fulfilling and meaningful life -, it is the most ordinary interpretation on 
technology. Many of us understand technology in such way. A business owner, 
for example, technology is a corporate asset for him to compete with his or her 
business rivals. Academically, nowadays students may think of technology as 
software and computer that help them significantly in working on their projects 
and assignments. Medically, a surgeon understands technology as a crucial part 
for him or her in conducting a surgery. For a scientist, it is the end product of 
one’s research. As for the smartphone users, which probably make the most of 
us today, technology is a sophisticated social-global communication tool. Based 
on those provided examples, we may understand that technology exists for the 
benefits of human being in dealing with practical problems. 
As mentioned previously, defining technology with just few well-chosen words is 
way too ambitious of a project and a challenging effort indeed. Thomas Hughes, 
as one of a historian of technology, has once stated that “defining technology in 
its complexity is as difficult as grasping the essence of politics” (Hughes, 2004, p. 
2). It is similar with an attempt to come up with the most objective and universal 
definition about art, in which it is difficult to pin down the complexity of human 
expression by only few words. To interpret what art is, what technology is, or 
what a thing is, we’re always wearing a certain spectacle or perspective that is not 
exactly neutral or totally objective and universal; a perspective which is born out 
of a specific context or a certain world.  
How do a business owner, a scientist, a surgeon, a student describe what 
technology is, as exemplified, is related with two interpretations from many 
historians of technology in studying the salient phenomenon of the twentieth 
century. First, many historians of technology pointing out that the twentieth 
century have been quite attentive to large technological systems, while the 
other historians from the same century  tend to look at technology from a 
user’s perspective in daily life (Misa, 2009, p. 8). From the former, the large 
technological systems refer to things such as electricity, industrial production, 
and transportation. While the latter refers to how do people deal with technology 
in solving their everyday life’s problems. What unifies both interpretations is 
related to what have been mentioned previously about ordinary understanding 
on technology in our modern contemporary life: technology is believed to be truly 
effectively beneficial for us. We judge how great and useful it is in accordance 
with the criterion of efficiency.
Up until now, treating technology as a means to an end for the benefit of human 
being is still current to us. But regardless that of socio-historical perspective that 
configures our common and popular understanding about technology, what is 
technology quintessentially? Or is our current perspective on technology really 
touching upon what technology is at its core? Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), in 
his The Question Concerning Technology (1977), proposed a different insight from 
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that of current and popular understanding. According to him, technology is not 
a mere means per se but “a way of revealing” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 14). The term 
“technology” itself stems from an ancient Greek technē and it “belongs to bringing 
forth, to poiēsis; it is something poietic” (Heidegger, 1977, p.14). In that sense of 
the word, technology is a mode of disclosing the uniqueness or singularity of 
things; it brings things (nature, world, or beings including human being) forth 
poetically. According to him, we can find this understanding of technē manifested 
in the forms of art, the arts of the minds and also fine arts.
Nevertheless, the understanding on technology in a sense of technē, is different 
with technology in a modern contemporary sense; an understanding that took 
its beginning in the 1750. It was characterized by the rise of machines as means 
for production, and also since then, the machine has become the only form of 
meaningful technique (Verene, 2004, p. 241). Modern technology, according to 
Heidegger, is also a way of revealing. What makes it different from the ancient 
technē is that modern technology is not understood in a sense of bringing-forth, 
but challenging-forth. He said that “the revealing that rules throughout modern 
technology has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of challenging forth. 
That challenging happens in that the energy is concealed in nature is unlocked, 
what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored 
up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever new. 
Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of 
revealing. But the revealing never simply comes to an end” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 16).
Modern technology represents the manner of interacting in terms of which 
humans encounter everything within the world as object to be used, to be 
enforced without limit, and to be manipulated at will (Sabatino, 2007, p. 64). 
The real or the reality itself is taken up as a standing reserve to be exhausted. It 
represents the manner in which humans have extended their reach to change, 
shape and thereby control just about everything we encounter within the world 
with practically no limit. Modern technology is about control and nothing has 
meaning if it’s not available to be used. Agriculture has been revealed as the 
mechanized food industry, water is now set upon as a hydroelectric power plant, 
sun has now been set as solar energy for electricity, while electricity is challenged 
forth to be the fuel for transportation, and so on. 
How the real is revealed as a standing reserved is related to what Heidegger took 
as the essence of modern technology, which is enframing (Heidegger, 1977, p. 20). 
What is this enframing means? It’s going back again to “the way in which the real 
reveals itself as standing reserve” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 21). In our contemporary 
life, enframing has become the most salient vision and conception of life; its 
worldview. In another way of saying it, enframing as the essence of technology 
has contaminated our contemporary life. It is as a particular way of being in the 
world that veils other ways of being in the world. Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980), 
described that modern technology (manifested as modern media of information) 
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has worked us over by altering and shaping the way we see the world (McLuhan, 
& Fiore, 2001, p. 26). Modern technology has become the environment itself; the 
dominating worldview.
In its progress, the development of modern technology is not driven by the 
complexity of ever renewed inventions. It is driven by deserting life’s traditional 
standards and simultaneously interwoven with the growth of science. David 
Tabachnick in his book entitled The Great Reversal – How We Let Technology Take 
Control of the Plane, pointed out the concrete examples from the consequences of 
modern science and technology’s development which stems from the dismissal 
of tradition. These two exemplified consequences are comprehended under 
Heideggerian essential understanding of technology as enframing. There are two 
unsettling and related consequences: the first one is the more obvious one while 
the second one is the less obvious (Tabachnick, 2013, p. 21). The former refers to 
the world wars. Instead of treating science and technology as a means to improve 
the quality of human life, we built and developed a technology to eliminate other 
fellow human being in a most efficient way. In this case, technology serves human 
appetites for destruction and power.
The later or the less obvious one refers to human enhancement technology 
that might be illustrated by the recent discoveries in biotechnology and 
psychopharmacology. Basically, human enhancement technology or it is 
also commonly labeled as human augmentation, is an emerging field within 
medicine and bioengineering that aims to develop technology and techniques for 
overcoming current limitation of human cognitive and physical abilities (Brey, 
2009, p. 169). It’s a mode of challenging forth the traditional understanding about 
the aims of medicine, which is to cure and treat illness. Human enhancement 
technology aims to challenge, to transcend the human condition beyond a state 
of mere health and it influenced the way we judge ourselves. How healthy 
and happy we are, judged from how do we finally choose to undergo certain 
treatment. Treatment such as stem cell therapy, skin whitening treatment, 
cosmetic plastic surgery procedure, and so on. This is problematic since these 
inventions of modern science and technology, try to recalibrate or manipulate our 
passions; our way of being human.
From those two exemplified consequences, we may say that modern technology 
is all about desire (Verene, 2004, p. 239). Modern technology has become the 
manifestation of our wild and unlimited desires to master and dominate other 
people, the world, and ironically even our own selves. Reason, as an intrinsic 
aspect in modern technology, “is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions,” 
(Hume, 1978, p. 283) as David Hume (1711 – 1776) said. Through the inherence 
of instrumental reason and scientism, modern technology has become that of 
cybernetics. Scientism is an ideology that understands scientific methods as 
the one and only way for us to achieve the most valid truth. While cybernetics 
is understood as a purposeful machine and also a model to understand 
purposeful behavior in living creatures (including us) with its mechanical telos 
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(Pickering, 2009, p. 118). It is presenting itself to steer (from the word kybernân) 
ways of our being in the world for the sake of domination and manipulation. 
Perhaps, Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969) and Max Horkheimer (1895-1973), 
the 20th century philosophers of the Frankfurt School were right when they said 
that “technological rationale is the rationale of domination itself” (Adorno & 
Horkheimer, 1973, p. 121). Touching upon reason means we have intersected 
with one of the dimensions of human being. It shows that in discussing modern 
technology is inseparable with a certain conception of man. 
tHE ConCEptIon oF MAn In ModErn tECHnoloGy – tHE 
proBlEM 
There is no explanation about human society without any description on how 
do they relate themselves with technology in a sense of technē or the modern 
contemporary one. Conversely, it is going to be very difficult to describe what 
technology is without touching upon a certain conception on what human being 
is. How modern technology reveals reality as mere objects to be exhausted, 
how its rationale is that of domination, or how reason is apparently slave 
to passion in the age of modern technology, are all presupposing a certain 
metaphysical assumption on man. The metaphysical anthropological assumption 
that is intended to be highlighted here is the one of French philosopher, René 
Descartes (1596-1650). He is the one that we can consider as the father of modern 
philosophy. Though he is the father of modern philosophy, it will be too much 
for us to judge him as the cause of our modern contemporary life with all of its 
challenges. The further discussion will not cover all aspects from his philosophical 
views but only the ones that are relevant to our main concern, which is modern 
technology. The writing on this part is an attempt to show how his philosophical 
view on man is actually the basis for our modern technological life. In order to do 
that, we can start from what is philosophy according to René Descartes.
For Descartes, philosophy was not a mere practical wisdom, but more 
importantly, about wisdom in a sense of gaining true knowledge. It was his 
fundamental aim to reach a philosophical truth based on reason (Copleston, 
1958, p. 67). Through putting an emphasis on the search for true knowledge, we 
may understand in a very broad sense that his philosophy is an epistemology. 
There are two philosophical perspectives from Descartes that are orbiting to 
epistemology that will be put under the discussion here. First, it is related to his 
view on the significance of method. Second, the discussion will be highlighting 
his metaphysical “I”, which is his anthropological conception on person. These 
two philosophical perspectives are closely correlated with each other and also 
intimately linked with the role of modern technology as a prominent worldview 
in our contemporary life.
In his view, method is crucial for us to attain the infallible truth about the real. 
Method is understood simply as a set of rules. These rules need to be applied as 
a step-by-step process. According to Descartes, the rules that configure a method 
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are rules for employing rightly the natural capacities and operations of the mind 
(Copleston, 1958, p. 73). Method will be fallacy proof if the rules contained in it 
are based on the operations of mind or reason; then the rules will be effectively 
utilized to attain the truth. But then, what did Descartes mean by natural 
capacities and operations of mind? The answers to this question are intuition 
and deduction (Copleston, 1958, p. 74). What Descartes meant by intuition is 
an intellectual seeing or vision which is clear, distinct, and it leaves no room for 
doubt. Intuition, therefore, is understood as a pure mental activity. Deduction, 
on the other hand, is described as an inference from facts that are known with 
certainty. These are the two methods that will orient us to the certainty of 
knowledge; they are necessary to give us as a sense of security. Certain and secure 
to be utilized. These methods are also inherent and presupposed in modern 
technology. In challenging the water forth as a hydroelectric power plant, we 
need to know some natural fact about water and electricity subsequently we need 
to apply the deductive reasoning in a form of procedure to be finally manifested 
as hydroelectric power plant. This is also may be exemplified by our daily use 
of smartphones. We need to think operationally, procedurally intuitive and 
deductive to have finally used all the applications installed in it. 
There is a certain demand for us to affirm with the reality and truth of the method 
in technology. We are not really precisely using it since we need to conform 
ourselves with its technique and procedure; we need to comply to its intrinsic 
criterion. Nothing is real and nothing is true unless it can be executed through a 
step by step ordering, formed as a procedure (Verene, 2004, p. 237). As Descartes 
suggested, by the power of intuition and deductive reasoning, we can overcome 
the challenges, the mystery of the real, when it is chopped down into parts 
then working on it procedurally from the simplest to the most complex. To this 
extent, along with Descartes, we may say that to attain certainty, we need to deal 
with everything by method. What Descartes did was formulating an intellectual 
method for attaining the certainty of truth, but what we are doing is actualizing, 
conducting it daily not only in dealing with our gadget but also in human affairs 
that is accumulated to what we know as SOP or standard operational procedure. 
This understanding of ‘everything must be done by method for the sake truth’ 
implies a certain anthropological framework on what is precisely human being.
Since method is based on the fundamental operations of mind, and it is the only 
way to attain the certainty of truth, Descartes’ metaphysical conception of man is 
not secluded from this insight. It is reflected and confirmed by the famous dictum 
of his, cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am). The dictum was intended to show 
that the existence of a person is determined by his or her mind; existing equals 
thinking. Consequently, human being for Descartes is thinking being. The ‘I’ in 
Descartes’ view is the thinking ‘I’ or the subject.  The thinking ‘I’ for Descartes is 
certain and leaves no room for doubt. For Descartes, I who thinks can doubt the 
certainty of everything except the I who is thinking (Copleston, 1958, p. 97). The I 
who thinks that everything is open to be doubted, is itself certain and indubitable. 
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As he said, “I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I 
mentally conceive it” (Descartes, 1911, p. 150).
Descartes reduced all the complexity of existing or being human to mind or 
thought. We may ask then, what about body? Or how is thinking related to body? 
Through these questions, we are touching upon Descartes’ dualistic approach to 
human being. His philosophical perspective on human being is understood under 
the banner of mind-body dualism. According to his dualism, mind and body are 
two distinct substances. These two substances are different in nature and capable 
of existing apart (Copleston, 1958, p. 116). The body, cybernatically speaking, is 
considered as a mechanical object that is controlled and steered for the mind to 
achieve its purpose. The body is substantially an object to the mind, while mind 
is the subject. How body is related to the mind is understood in subject-object 
dichotomy.
The thinking ‘I’ in Descartes view on human being is asserted as the essential 
point of reality. The ratification of human being as thinking being has been 
crucially promoting the emerging of modern technological life. As exemplified 
previously, the Cartesian method of mental intuition and deductive reasoning (as 
applied and necessary in natural science) is inherent in modern technology with 
the challenging forth as its characteristic. Since the method itself is mind or mental 
latent, therefore it is the thinking ‘I’ that works on the method and working 
on the method allows the ‘I’ to master its object (body, nature, the world, and 
everything that is impermanent). Turn what was opaque, blurry, and mysterious, 
into something that is certain, clear, and distinct (Verene, 2004, p. 239). It leaves no 
room for mystery for sure.
The modern technological universe is fully populated by this thinking ‘I’ and 
it leads to one philosophical problem, namely disembodiment. The problem 
of disembodiment may be understood in two ways that to a certain extent are 
actually intersecting. First, modern technology through the inherent thinking ‘I’ is 
orders everything through technique. It treats the world as an objective standing 
reserve to be exhausted, to everything this thinking ‘I’ desires since it has what 
it takes to do that. But this attempt to fulfill all desires results nothing, it always 
leaves a never ending hollow space in the modern person. We can see this in the 
world wars and the emerging of human enhancement technology as mentioned 
previously. The thinking ‘I’ sees everything as an everlasting problem to be solved 
through method and technique, therefore the challenging of everything forth is 
also perpetual. Again, it leaves no room for mystery. More fundamentally, the 
thinking ‘I’ is cut off from its struggle in life, from the intimate engagement with 
the world since the world is viewed as a mere standing reserve to be exhausted 
by method and technique. The modern technology disembodies the relationship 
between human being with the world. Secondly, based on the way Cartesian ‘I’ 
treats body as a mere mechanical object, modern technology disembodies our 
ontological relationship with our concrete body. The most vulgar example of this, 
again, shown by the progressive development of human enhancement technology. 
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In which the body is progressively challenged forth as if the body is detached 
from us and merely a standing reserve. The Cartesian ‘I’ has been promoting the 
bodiless floating self. But is that it? Are we all truly a crowd of ghosts in the shell? 
Is there any other way for us to view the real as not a mere standing reserve? The 
next part of this paper is an attempt to answer such questions.
Art AS tHE EMBodIMEnt – A WAy out
This part of the paper is an attempt to show how art, especially painting, may 
‘save’ us from the disembodiment that has been the consequences of living 
in the modern science and technology era. In order to do this, I will borrow 
some of the phenomenological insights, mainly, from one French philosopher, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 – 1961). Phenomenology is an early 20th century 
philosophical discipline that deals with what appears and simultaneously 
together with its appearing. It designates that which appears in its very appearing 
(Lewis & Staehler, 2010, p. 7). In short, it’s a philosophical discipline that studies 
the ‘how to’ and ‘what is’ of things in their appearing. For Merleau-Ponty, 
his phenomenology is mainly occupied with the problem of perception. His 
phenomenological view on perception is not like Cartesian one, which is a mental 
construction.
Perception to Merleau-Ponty is practical involvement with things (Matthews, 
2006, p. 21). To perceive something is not to think abstractly or analytical about 
it but to deal with it directly and concretely. This phenomenological view 
on perception is simultaneously inseparable with his view on the body. The 
fundamental characteristic of perception is that it always a bodily one. Perception 
is always an embodied perception and the body is primordially a perceptual 
body. First of all, we understand the world around us with and through our 
body. We’re not some floating bodiless consciousness like that of Cartesian. We 
are our bodies (Carman, 2008, p. 11). Body, from Merleau-Ponty, is a condition of 
possibility of being in the world. This means that we are belong to a world and 
simultaneously open to the worlds in and through the body. He stated that “the 
body is our anchorage in the world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 144). Body is not a 
mere mechanical object to be controlled by the Cartesian thinking ‘I’.
Likewise, Merleau-Ponty’s view of the world is also different with the modern 
science and technology perspective that is founded on the Cartesian thinking 
‘I’. The world is not mere a standing reserve, an object to be manipulated and 
exhausted. It is not before us, but first of all, we are in the world. It is the place 
in which we live our lives, the world we act in, have feelings and hopes about, as 
well as the world we are always trying to know about (Matthews, 2006, p. 20). As 
Merleau-Ponty said himself, “the world is what we perceive” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962, p. viii). In short, the world is not an objective property but it is the one 
which constitutes our existence.
Basically, what Merleau-Ponty wanted to promote through his phenomenological 
account is that our primordial contact with the world through bodily 
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perception precedes the reflective and abstract way of seeing the world. This 
phenomenological account of his on bodily perception is closely related to his 
account on art, especially painting. His philosophical account on art, likewise his 
phenomenology, is started precisely from a critical response to Cartesian thinking 
‘I’, to Cartesian mind-body dualism. Since the thinking ‘I’ has become the basis 
for the modern contemporary technology, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
account on art may be read as also a critical response to it. According to Merleau-
Ponty, modern science and technology “manipulates things and gives up living 
in them” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 159). The real (including the concrete body 
and also the world) exists to be manipulated and constructed. It disembodies our 
intimate engagement with the world and our own bodies because “it makes its 
own limited models of things; operating upon these indices or variables to effect 
whatever transformations are permitted by their definition, it comes face to face 
with the real world only at rare intervals” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 159). It treats 
the real as objects in general, as if they have no meaning to us except as utilities. 
This is not the case with an artist or a painter. He or she has a different way of 
seeing the world and according to Merleau-Ponty, his or her way of seeing or 
looking at things is not the same with that of Cartesian intellectual way of seeing. 
It is not seeing in modern technological sense, which is challenging things forth. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, a painter is truly aware of the enigma of seeing, he 
or she is aware “that my body simultaneously sees and is seen” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1964, p. 162). To see is to be open to a world, to be penetrated and possessed 
by it. Merleau-Ponty illustrated this way of seeing from a situation that was 
experienced visually by one Swiss painter, Paul Klee (1879-1940).
“In a forest, I have felt many times over that it was not I who looked at the 
forest. Some days I felt that the tress were looking at me, were speaking to 
me…I was there, listening…I think that the painter must be penetrated by the 
universe and not want to penetrate it…I expect to be inwardly submerged, 
buried. Perhaps I paint to break out.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 167) 
In seeing, we are possessed by the things that we see, by the world, but at the 
same time it becomes an annex or prolongation of our selves (Merleau-Ponty, 
1964, p. 163). The world is embodied in us, it becomes part of us. When it is 
expressed in painting, painting becomes the manifestation of our embodiment. 
Painting is a bodily expression; it’s the manifestation of our embodied relation 
with the world. But then we ask: why painting? As Merleau-Ponty said, it is 
because the painters take the body with them and lend it while painting (Merleau-
Ponty, 1964, p. 161). In painting, the dichotomy between subject-object, between 
the one who paints and the painted, is dissolved. This means, to paint is to be 
painted.
Since the painter responds the world through seeing, he or she brings forth what 
others do not see. Thereby, a painting “gives visible existence to what profane 
vision believes to be invisible” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 166). What has been 
eclipsed by our modern technological life is revealed differently. What has been 
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challenged forth and enframed, brought forth poetically through painting. By 
making visible of what is invisible, art’s highest calling is in helping us to get 
attuned. It has the power to re-attune our relationship with ourselves and with 
the world. Re-attuning the relationship that might have been crystalized by a 
challenging forth characteristics of modern technology. 
ConCluSIon 
Modern technology reduces life with its dimensions as a problem and leaves no 
room for mystery. Problems, as popularly understood, is usually dealt by stating, 
proposing solutions, analyzing, and accepting or rejecting. Mystery, on the other 
hand, or what Merleau-Ponty labels it as enigma, is different from problem. As 
Merleau-Ponty suggests, mysteries can only be named, gestured at, and pondered 
(Carman, 2008, p. 7). The similarity between problem and mystery is they both 
deal with the questions of being, time, knowledge, love, and no less profound, 
death. The difference is in the way we deal with them. Regarding what has been 
discussed in this paper, I will touch upon the question of death. It is the question 
that expresses our being as mortal or our finitude.  
Treating finitude as a problem that needs to be solved is the nature of modern 
technology, it is its being. This equals to disengaging the constitutive element 
of our own very existence. Human augmentation is one way which modern 
technology deals with our finitude. It challenges forth our finitude and it againsts 
our being as mortal, or being-unto-death as in Heideggerian term (Demske, 1970, 
p.2). It is purposefully constructed to forget that what makes our life meaningful 
is death. We are always in search for meaning because we know that one day we 
will die. Modern technology through the development of human augmentation, 
dries out the meaningfulness of life by infecting us with the illusion of “forever 
young”; the enframing delusional aim for immortality.
Art, on the other hand, embraces life and its finitude as mystery. With its highest 
calling, art helps us to get attuned with things (Wrathall, 2011, p. 28). Things that 
may also refer to the finitude of our being as mortal. Art entices us to listen to, in 
Merleau-Ponty’s term, the voice of silence. It purveys an admonition to pause for 
a while in a life which is accelerated by the advances, noises and glut of modern 
technologies. To pause means to put ourselves in attunement. It means to listen 
and inhabit the silence that permeates the world, to get in touch with our pre-
reflective and embodied relationship with the world (Mazis, 2016, p. 7). Lastly, 
unlike the modern technology, to pause is to embrace our finitude in a poetic 
sense. A necessary pause as the prelude to one truly meaningful act. Last but not 
least, this writing doesn’t try to fully condemn modern technology per se. This 
writing is simply an alarm. An alarm to pause ourselves for a while from the 
hassle dazzle yet comfortable of our contemporary life.
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